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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Appellant's brief comply with Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is the Appellant 
required to marshal the evidence when challenging the 
court's findings? 
2. Did the Appellant, the moving party on his 
counterclaim seeking reimbursement of monies, have the 
burden to prove the amount, if any, that should be 
reimbursed? The standard of review on this issue of law 
is one of correctness. Campbell v State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co. 2001 Ut. 89, P.3d (Utah 2001), Provo City 
V Willden 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
3. Do the facts support the amount that the court 
determined for damages as of the date of Appellant's 
breach of the agreement? The standard of review is 
whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
Macris v Sculptured Software Inc. 24 P.3d 984, 514 (Utah 
2001). 
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4. Is Appellant entitled to interest on any monies 
the court determines should be reimbursed to him? The 
standard of review on this issue of law is one of 
correctness. Campbell v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. 
2001 Ut. 89, P.3d (Utah 2001), Provo City V 
Willden 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case. 
Appellees, Melvin Dale Peterson and Darlene Peterson 
(hereinafter referred to as Petersons), as sellers, and 
Appellant, Nick J. Nikols (hereinafter referred to as 
Nikols) as buyer, entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract regarding the sale of real property located in 
Duchesne County Utah at a price of $65,000.00. The 
contract was dated September 10, 1981. Addendum 1. 
Nikols defaulted on the contract, and Petersons, pursuant 
to paragraph 16A of the contract, terminated the 
contract, gave notice to quit and retook possession of 
the property on June 1, 1983. T. 28 At the time of 
entering into the contract, Nikols had recorded a Notice 
of Contract in the Duchesne County Recorder's Office. R. 
132 In approximately March 1999, Petersons were informed 
2 
by the Duchesne County Recorder that the Notice of 
Contract had not been released. R. 34 When Nikols 
refused to release the Notice of Contract at Peterson's 
request, Peterson's filed this action to quiet title. R. 
10 The complaint was filed on April 2, 1999. R. 10 
Nikols filed a counterclaim claiming a novation or an 
accord and satisfaction and seeking reimbursement of the 
monies he paid on the contract. The counterclaim was 
filed on May 14, 1999. R. 18 
b. Course of proceedings 
The trial court partially granted Petersons' Motion 
for Summary Judgement finding that Nikols failed to make 
his payments owed on the contract, that Nikols vacated 
the property in 1983, that there was damage to the 
property when Nikols vacated, that the contract had been 
terminated, that Nikols' claims of novation, accord and 
satisfaction and statutes of limitation failed as a 
matter of law but that a hearing needed to be held to 
determine if Petersons' damages, as a result of Nikols' 
breach, reasonably approximated the amount forfeited when 
the contract was terminated. Addendum 2 R. 152. No 
one appealed that ruling. The trial court set for trial 
3 
Nikols' counterclaim to determine whether Nikols was 
entitled to reimbursement of the payments made on the 
contract and to determine if the amount forfeited was 
"grossly excessive and disproportionate to any possible 
loss so as to shock the conscience" , Johnson v Carman 572 
P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977). If the Court concluded that 
the amount forfeited was "grossly excessive and 
disproportionate to any loss", then it needed to 
determine what amount should be repaid to Nikols. 
c. Disposition in the lower court. 
Trial was held to the court on September 21, 2000, 
following which the trial court determined that Nikols 
had paid $39,856.00 on the $65,000.00 purchase price 
agreed to in the contract and that Petersons' damages 
were $35,507.00. The court found the difference was not 
grossly excessive or disproportionate, but still ordered 
the Petersons to pay Nikols the sum of $4,385.00. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law R. 243, Addendum 
3, Corrected Judgment R. 2 98, Addendum 4, Amended Order, 
R. 278 Addendum 5. Petersons tendered that amount to 
Nikols, which Nikols refused and then Nikols filed this 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petersons own approximately 40 acres of recreational 
property along the Duchesne River in Duchesne County, 
Utah. T. 2. Petersons paid $35,000 for the property in 
1972. T. 4 Located on the property was a cabin. 
Petersons borrowed $25,474.81 from Commercial Security 
Bank in 1978 and used at least $10,000.00 of that loan to 
renovate the cabin in 1979 - 1980. T. 4, 5, and 71. 
Prior to renovating the cabin the property rented for 
$250.00 per month or $3,000.00 per year. T. 5, 6. 
In 1981 Petersons had medical expenses that needed 
to be paid. Therefore, they listed the property for 
sale. T.55 Nikols, on behalf of his father, decided to 
purchase the property for recreational purposes. T. 96 
Nikols' intent was to build a nice cabin and put in a 
bridge. T. 98 The parties agreed on a purchase price of 
$65,000.00 to be financed by Petersons. Nikols also 
agreed to pay the water assessments and taxes, keep the 
property in good repair and keep the property insured. 
A Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed by the parties 
which provided for installment payments of the purchase 
price and the assumption of the mortgage Petersons had 
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with Commercial Security Bank. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2. 
Nikols paid part of the amount owed to Petersons and part 
of the payments to Commercial Security Bank. The total 
paid by Nikols was $39,856-00. Of that amount $34,000.00 
was paid to Petersons and the remainder to Commercial 
Security Bank. T. 7-8, 48, 61-61, Exhibit 3. Nikols 
failed to pay the taxes in the amount of $362.27 and the 
water assessments in the amount of $84.21. T.44-45. 
Nikols also failed to keep the property in good repair 
and failed to insure the property. T. 16, 87. 
In 1982, while visiting the property Nikols 
determined that the cabin located thereon had been 
vandalized. T.17 The cabin was no longer habitable. T. 
19 Nikols then became concerned that the property was 
located too far from other inhabitants and if he built a 
new cabin on the property it would also be vandalized. 
T.lll Nikols then ceased making the payments on the 
contract. 
When Petersons received notice from Commercial 
Security Bank that Nikols was not making the payments, 
Petersons exercised their rights under paragraph 16A of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract and in May 1983 gave 
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notice to quit and retook possession of the property. 
T.28 At that time the cabin was uninhabitable and would 
require at least $20,000.00 to repair. T. 23, 59 
Many years passed. In 1999, Petersons were informed 
by the Duchesne County Recorder that the Notice of 
Contract filed by Nikols in the Duchesne Recorder's 
office had not been released. R. 34 When Nikols refused 
to release that document, Petersons filed this action to 
quiet title. R. 3 Nikols counter claimed asking that 
all the monies that he paid on the contract be reimbursed 
based on theories of novation and accord and 
satisfaction. 
Neither party presented appraisal evidence as to the 
value of the property in May 1983 when Petersons retook 
possession of the property and after the cabin was 
vandalized. Evidence was provided as to the amount of 
the unpaid taxes and water assessments, Exhibits 7 and 8, 
that the cost to repair the cabin would have been 
$20,000.00, T. 23, 33-34 but Nikols had not obtained 
insurance on the property so there were no monies 
available to make the repairs and therefore it had not 
been repaired T. 87, and that the property, prior to the 
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renovation of the cabin, rented for $250.00 per month. T. 
5 Other evidence presented as to value was the 1982 tax 
notice that valued the property at $25,000.00, (page 2 of 
Exhibit 7) and the fact that Commercial Security Bank had 
loaned $25,000.00 on the property prior to the cabin 
being renovated. T. 2-4, 65, 71. Finally, according to 
the express terms of the contract, Nikols had himself 
agreed to pay $65,000.00 for the property in 1981. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Nikols brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nikols also fails to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
decision. Nikols' brief should be disregarded and the 
trial court's decision affirmed. 
2. Nikols had the burden of proof on his 
counterclaim and failed to present any evidence of the 
value of the property at the time of his default and 
Petersons retaking possession. He cannot now complain 
about the court making its decision based on the limited 
information provided by the parties. 
3. The trial court correctly decided the loss of 
bargain damages as of the date of default by Nikols. 
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Nikols misconstrues the court's use of the term "present 
state". 
4. Nikols is not entitled to interest on any monies 
that Petersons may be ordered to repay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: NIKOLS FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND 
THEREFORE HIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Nikol's brief should comply with Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. He should set forth legal 
analysis on the issues presented and he is required to 
marshal all the evidence that supports the court's 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings in question. 
Failure to do so may result in this Court disregarding 
Nikols' arguments and sustaining the decision by the 
trial or court. Smith v. Smith 995 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 
App. 1999); Lefavi v. Bertich, 994 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah 
App. 2000); Phillips v. Hatfield 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 
(Utah App. 1995); and Koulis v Standard Oil Co. of 
California 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court entered specific conclusions of law. 
Addendum 3. Nikols never mentions those conclusions of 
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law but rather goes into rambling arguments about whether 
the evidence supported the decision but never marshals 
the evidence he is challenging. The reason he fails to 
marshal the evidence is that he had the burden to 
establish his claims in his counterclaim and Nikols 
presented no evidence to the court to support his 
counterclaim. 
POINT II: NIKOLS, WHO HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
ON HIS COUNTER CLAIM, PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
WAS A FORFEITURE. NIKOLS CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN 
ABOUT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION BASED ON THE 
EVIDENCE IT RECEIVED FROM THE PETERSONS. 
Petersons filed the complaint seeking to quiet 
title. Nichols filed a counterclaim seeking return of 
the monies he had paid on the contract. The court, by 
summary judgment, found that Nikols had breached the 
agreement, that Petersons retook possession of the 
property as provided in the contract and the court denied 
Nikols' claims of novation, accord and satisfaction and 
statutes of limitations. The court then set for trial 
Nikols' request for reimbursement. Nikols therefore had 
the burden to show that the liquidated damage clause, 
paragraph 16a of the contract signed by the parties, 
should not be enforced because the amount forfeited was 
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grossly excessive and disproportionate to the actual loss 
so as to shock the conscience of the court. Johnson v. 
Carman 572 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977). 
The general rule is that parties may contract as to 
the amount of liquidated damages that should be paid in 
the case of a breach. The exception to the rule is stated 
in Johnson v. Carman supra as follows: 
The provision in a contract for the sale of real 
property that all payments which have been made will 
be forfeited as liquidated damages will not be 
enforced if the forfeiture would be grossly 
excessive and disproportionate to the possible loss 
so as to shock the conscience. 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d at 373. In determining the 
possible loss, the court includes loss of benefit of the 
bargain, attorney's fees, costs to restore the premises, 
real estate commissions paid, rent or interest, and the 
damage or depreciation to the property. Id. (allowing 
interest, loss of benefit of bargain, attorney's fees and 
costs to restore); Jensen v. Nielsen 485 P.2d 673, 674 
(Utah 1971) (allowing reasonable rental, real estate 
commissions, taxes and water assessments) ; Clegg v. Lee, 
516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (allowing legal fees as 
damages); and Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah 
1952) (allowing loss of benefit of bargain, damages or 
11 
depreciation to the property, decline in value and fair 
rental value). 
In this case the amount forfeited, $39,856.00, is 
easily offset by the loss sustained by Petersons. 
Petersons' loss is as follows: 
Fair rental (14 months at $250.00 per month): 3,500.00 
Water assessments: 84.21 
Taxes: 362.27 
Legal fees: (R. 183) 5,558.00 
Loss of Bargain: $35,000.00 
Real Estate Commission (Addendum 1, R. 129) 3,900.00 
Total: x $48,404.48 
Nikols main complaint appears to be about the amount 
determined by the court for the decline in value of the 
property. Nikols, the moving party on his counterclaim 
i 
The trial court refused to include legal fees and fair 
rental in its calculation which is error. The trial 
court also ordered the return of $4,385.00 to Nikols 
while concluding that the amount forfeited was not 
excessive or unconscionable. That also was error. 
Petersons, however, are willing to live with the court's 
decision and therefore elected not to file a counter 
appeal. In the event this case is remanded Petersons 
would like the opportunity to again claim those losses 
and not be required to repay any monies since the amount 
forfeited is not grossly excessive and does not shock the 
conscience. 
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however, put on no evidence to show that the amount 
forfeited was grossly excessive or disproportionate to 
the possible loss incurred by Petersons. Nor did Nikols 
put on any evidence of the possible losses incurred by 
Petersons. Nikols did admit that there was a cabin on 
the property that had been vandalized during the time he 
was in possession. "It is the wrongdoer, rather than the 
injured party, who should bear the burden of some 
uncertainty in the amount of damages, ... the standard 
for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting 
as the standard for proving the fact of damages. Pro Max 
Development Corp v Mattson 943 P.2d 247, (Utah App. 1997) 
citing Atkin, Wright and Miles v Mountain State Tel. & 
Tel. Co. 709 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1985). 
Nikols furnished no appraisal or other proof as to 
the value of the property in May 1983 when the contract 
was forfeited. The court had the fact that Duchesne 
County appraised it at $25,000.00 for its 1982 tax 
notice, that Commercial Security Bank after an appraisal 
loaned $25,000.00 against the property, that Petersons 
had paid $35,000.00 and spent another $10,000.00 on the 
cabin which had then been vandalized while in the 
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possession of Nikols and would cost $20,000.00 to repair 
and that it rented for $250.00 per month.2 All that 
evidence would support a value as of May 1983 of 
$25,000.00. If anything Nikols received the benefit of 
the lack of evidence by the $30,000.00 value set by the 
court. 
With respect to the loss of bargain, the evidence 
was that Nikols purchased the property as a recreational 
property and that it had a unique appeal to him. Nikols 
agreed to purchase the property for $65,000.00, in part, 
based on the appeal this piece of property had to him. 
It is unclear from the court's order whether the basis 
for the reduction of the value was the damage to the 
cabin, or simply that other purchasers did not value the 
property the same as Nikols. Irrespective of the reason 
for the decrease in value, Petersons suffered a loss of 
bargain damage of $35,000.00. The trial court was very 
aware that this loss of bargain damage was a relevant 
factor in determining whether the forfeiture was grossly 
2 
A general rule of thumb is that property should rent for 
1% per month of its value. Johnson v Carman, 372 P.2d 
371, 374 (Utah 1977)(dissenting opinion). That rule of 
thumb would set the value of the property at $25,000.00. 
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excessive and disproportionate. Indeed, the trial court 
correctly noted that it was not for the court to 
determine whether Nikols made a mistake when he concluded 
at the time of the contracting that the property was 
worth $65,000.00. "Recognizing the principal that 
parties should be permitted to enter into contracts that 
may actually be one-sided or unreasonable should not be 
rejected by the Court. It is generally held that persons 
have a right to contract freely to make real and genuine 
mistakes when their dealings are at arms length/' Trial 
Court's Order, p. 3, Addendum 5. Based on this legal 
principal, and the evidence of the value of the property 
at the time that Petersons took it back in 1983, the 
Court found that the loss of bargain from the breach of 
contract was $35,000.00, plus the total of the taxes and 
water assessments. Because the amount paid and forfeited 
and the amount of the loss of the bargain were roughly 
equivalent, the court correctly determined that the 
forfeiture was not grossly excessive. 
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POINT III: NIKOLS MISSTATES THE COURT'S RULING 
AS OF THE DATE THE COURT VALUED THE LOSS OF 
BARGAIN. THE TERM "PRESENT STATE" USED BY THE 
COURT REFERS TO THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY 
NOT THE DATE OF VALUATION. 
Nikols claims the court valued the property as of 
the date of trial, not as of the date of default. In 
making that argument Nikols misstates the court's 
decision. The court clearly valued the property as of 
the date of default which is consistent with the 
decisions of the Court. Bellon v Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 
1094 (Utah 1991). The trial court used the rental 
value, the tax notice, the repair costs and the amount 
loaned on the property, all of which facts were at or 
near the time of the default, to determine the value of 
the property at the time of default. Nikols hangs his 
argument on the court's use of the term "present state" 
in its ruling as to the value of the property. The court 
when using that term was referring to the condition of 
the property not the date the court was calculating 
damages. The present state of the property had not 
changed since the date of default as the cabin that was 
vandalized prior to default had not been repaired and 
remained in the same condition. To claim that "present 
16 
state" really means '"present time", as Nikols' does, 
would require the Court to ignore all of the evidence 
received by the Court to determine the value, which 
evidence all occurred in the early 1980 fs and not the 
late 1990fs. 
POINT IV: NIKOLS IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON ANY MONIES PETERSONS MAY BE 
REQUIRED TO PAY TO NIKOLS. 
Nikols also claims that he is entitled to 
prejudgment interest on any monies Petersons are required 
to repay him. He makes this claim even though he waited 
over 17 years to make any claim for reimbursement. 
Nikols argument has been previously rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 
1991). In Bellon v. Malnar the Defendants had been 
ordered to repay $26,058.33 to Bellon. Bellon argued 
that he was entitled to prejudgment interest on that 
amount. The Court rejected that claim stating: 
No case has been cited to us where we have 
allowed prejudgment interest in an action such 
as the instant case, which is for equitable 
relief. "A suit of this nature involving the 
invocation of a forfeiture and/or the 
enforcement of a purchase contract invokes 
consideration of the principles of equity which 
address themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court/7 Fuller v. 
Blood, 546 P.2d at 610. In view of the highly 
17 
equitable nature of this action where the court 
has discretion in determining the amount, if 
any, to be returned to the defaulting vendee, 
we find no error in the denial of prejudgment 
interest. 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d at 1097. Thus, the holding of 
Bellon precludes the Court from awarding prejudgment 
interest in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is requested that the trial court's decision be 
affirmed. 
Dated this Qv day of November, 2001. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
McCLELLAN & TROTTER P.C. 
Attorneys for 
Appellees/Plaintiffs 
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AODENDEM I 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
rrfe 
z-
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CON1KALI 
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice." T - 7 9 1 1 0 
\, THIS AGREKMBNT, made in <luplicato this 1 0 U) day of Sep tember A D 19.11 
by and between . ^ L V I ^ D A L j ^ P E T ^ ^ ^ h i s w i f e , ' 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and NICK J . NIKOLS
 i 
i • r. i • » i n 11 " r Salt Lake City, Utah 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of . iJ 
2 
and the 
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
bu\cr for the consideration herein mentiqned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of , DHPilESNE_ , state of Utah, to-wlt: Myton t Utah (See l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n ) 
, , AOORES8 
More particularly described a3 follows: 
TWNSHIP 1 SOUTH OF RANGE 2 WEST OF THE UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN. 
SECTION 23: Lots 11 and 12 (SW^SEi) 
Together with 5 shares of Ute Indian Water Shares, AND all oil, gas & mineral rights 
2. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
_ _ _ _ - _ - SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND AND N O / 1 0 0 - . - Dollars (I 6 5 , 0 0 0 0 0 ) 
payable at the of fire of Seller, his assigns or order n_? d i r e c t e d b y S e l l e r 
strieth uith.n the following times, to-wit: _ TWENTY THOUSAND AND N O / 1 0 0 ($__2_Q JJOQ.IX) > 
ca-.h, the ucoipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 4 5 , 0Q0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
$$10,000.00 applied to principal only on or before October 25, 1981. $10,000.00 
applied to principal only, on or before September 10, 1982. $3,156.81 applied to 
priucip.il only, on or before March 10, 1983. In addition to the foregoing principal 
payments, Buyer agrees to pay $488.00 principal and interest each month, commencing 
on the 10th day of October, 1981 and on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter 
until the entire remaining principal balance, together with accrued interest, is paid 
in full. 
Buver agrpes to pay general property taxes and fire insurance premiums as they becoioe due. 
Posses s ion of said p r e m i s e s shal l be del ivered to b u y e r on the LQ.tLQ d a y of S e p t e m b e r , 19—8J.— 
4. Said m o n t h l y p a y m e n t s a r e to be appl ied f i r s t to the p a y m e n t of i n t e r e s t and second to t he r e d u c t i o n of t h e 
p r inc ipa l . In t e rc> t shal l be c h a r g e d from J3€LE>.fcember_liL> 1 9 8 1 on all u n p a i d p o r t i o n s of the 
It 
t o t h e t c i n i.i i i u i f i n MICIIIIWIICW, LIICII uy au u o i u ^ , JL WJII HI nu 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller 
G. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank ^ ^
 a n u n p a i d b a i a n c e 0f 
% ^ ^ l l l 9 as of Sep tember 10 , 1 9 8 1 . 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed f o u r t e e n / percent 
( . 1 4 - 1 / 4 ^ ; ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments re.|uiicd to bo made b\ Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made b> the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agTeea to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his r ;gM through acce'oraLed payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date, of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay I any |>onalt> winch may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said propei ty mcui red by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said, obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
'l0. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of .said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase pri<c above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining .said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
None 
ESC 103 
FIT A ill TrTF.E A Nil) A n ST R ACT COMPANY 
T h e Se l le r f u r t h e r c o v e n a n t s and a g r e e s t h a t he will not defaul t in the p a y m e n t of his ob l iga t ions a g a i n s t sa id p r o p e r t y . 
12 The B u y e r a g r e e s to p a y the genera l t axes a f t e r S e p t e m b e r 1 0 1 L 9 8 1 . l?ol T a x e s 
pro-rated at closing. 
13. T h e Buye r f u r t h e r a g r e e s to keep all i n su rab le bui ld ings and I m p r o v e m e n t s on said premiaea insured in 
d a y s t h e r e a f t e r , t h e 
p a n y accep tab le to the Svl lcr in the a m o u n t of not less t h a n the unpaid ba lance on th is con t rac t , o r j "" *" 
a n d In a s s i g n sold i n s u r a n c e to the Sel ler as his in te res t s m a y ' a p p e a r and to del iver tho in su rance policy to h im. 
14. In t he even t the B u y e r shal l de fau l t in the p a y m e n t of any special o r genera l t axes , a s s e s s m e n t s or i n s u r a n c e 
p r e m i u m s a s here in provided , the Sel ler m a y , a t his option, pay said t a x e s , a s s e s s m e n t s and in su rance p r e m i u m s or e i t h e r 
of t hem, and if Sel ler e lects so to do, then the Buye r a g i e e s lo r epay the Se l le r upon demand , all such s u m s so a d v a n c e d 
and paid by h im, t o g e t h e r wi th i n t e r e s t thereon from da te of payment of aaid auma a t the r a t e of % of one percent per 
m o n t h unt i l paid . 
U» B u y e r a g r e e s t h a t he will no t commit or suffer to be commi t t ed a n y was t e , spoil , or d e s t r u c t i o n in or u p o n 
sa id p r emise s , and t h a t he will m a i n t a i n said p remises in good condi t ion. 
Kt. In t he e v e n t of a f a i lu re to comply with the t e r m s hereof by the B u y e r , or upon fa i lure of the B u y e r to m a k e 
a n y payment or payments when t he same shall become duo, or wi th in t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) 
Se l le r , a t his opt ion shal l have the following a l t e rna t ive r e m e d i e s : 
A. Sel ler shal l have t he r i g h t , upon failure of the Buyer to r emedy the de fau l t wi th in five d a y s a f t e r w r i t t e n no t i ce , 
to be r e l eased from all ob l iga t ions in law and in equ i ty to c o n w y sa id p rope r ty , and all p a y m e n t s which h a v e 
been m a d e t h e r e t o f o r e on thib c o n t r a c t by the Buyer , Bhall be fo r fe i t ed to the Sel ler as l i qu ida t ed d a m a v - . for 
the n o n - p e r f o r m a n c e of t he con t rac t , and t h e Buyer a g r e e i t h a t the Sel ler m a y a t hia opt ion r e - e n t e r a n d t a k e 
possess ion of said p r e m i s e s wi thou t legal processes as in i t s f i rs t and fo rmer e s t a t e , t o g e t h e r wi th all i m p r o v e -
m e n t s and add i t i ons made by the Buyer thereon, and the said add i t ions and i m p r o v e m e n t s shal l r e m a i n w i th 
the land and become the p rope r ty of the Seller, the Buyer becoming' »t once a t e n a n t a t will of the Se l l e r ; o r 
B The Se l le r m a y b r i n g su i t and recover j u d g e m e n t for all de l inquent i n s t a l l m e n t s , inc luding cos t s and a t t o r n e y s 
fees. ( T h e ur>e of t h i s i e m c d y on one or more orcas ions shal l not p r e v e n t the Seller , a t his op t ion , f rom r e p o r t i n g 
to one of the o the r r e m e d i e s he r eunde r in the event of a s u b s e q u e n t d e f a u l t ) : or 
C. T h e S< Her shal l h a v e the r i g h t , a t his opt ion, and upon w r i t t e n notice to the Buyer , to dec la re t h e e n t i r e u n p a i d 
ba l ance h e r e u n d e r a t once due and payable , and may elect to t r e a t th i s con t r ac t as a note and m o r t a g e , and p a s s 
t i t le to the B u y e r s u b j e c t the re to , and proceed i m m e d i a t e l y to foreclose the s ame in accordance wi th t h e l a w s of 
the S t a t e of U t a h , and have the p rope r ty sold and the proceeds appl ied to the p a y m e n t of t he ba lance o w i n g , 
inc lud ing cos t s and a t t o r n e y ' s fees ; and the Seller m a y have a j u d g e m e n t for a n y deficiency which m a y r e m a i n . 
In the case of fo ieeJosure , the Sel ler he reunder , upon the f i l ing of a compla in t , shall be i m m e d i a t e l y e n t i t l e d to 
t he a p p o i n t m e n t of a l ecc ive r to t ake possession of sa id m o r t g a g e d p r o p e r t y and collect the r e n t s , i s sues a n d 
p ro f i t s t h e r e f r o m and app ly the s a m e to the p a y m e n t of the ob l iga t ion h e r e u n d e r , or hold the $ame p u r s u a n t 
to o r d e r of the c o u r t ; and the Sel ler , upon e n t r y of j u d g m e n t of fo rec losure , shal l be en t i t l ed to the p o s s e s s i o n 
of the said p ie /n i ses d u t i n g the period of redempt ion . 
17. I t is a g r e e d t h a t t u n e is the essence of th is a g r e e m e n t . 
lfl In t he e v e n t t he i e a r e a n y Bens or encumbrances a g a i n s t said p r e m i s e s o the r t han those he re in provided fo r o r 
r e f e r r e d to, or in the even t a n y l iens or e n c u m b r m e e s o ther t h a n here in provided for shall h e r e a f t e r acc rue a g a i n s t t h e 
s a m e b\ acta or neglec t of the Sel ler , then the Buyer may, at his opt ion, pay and d i scha rge the s a m e and receive c r e d i t 
on the a m o u n t then r e m a i n i n g due he reunde r in the a m o u n t of a n y such p a y m e n t or p a y m e n t s and t h e r e a f t e r t h e p a y -
m e n t s here in p rov ided to be m a d e , may , a t the option of the Buyer , be suspended unti l such a t i m e a s such s u s p e n d e d 
p a y m e n t s sha l l equa l any s u m s advanced as aforesaid 
19. The Se l l e r on rece iv ing the p a y m e n t s herein reserved to be paid a t the t ime and in the m a n n e r above m e n t i o n e d 
a g r e e s to e x e c u t e and del iver to t h e B u y e r or a s s igns , a good and suf f ic ien t w a r r a n t y deed convey ing the t i t l e to t h e 
above dcsc i ibed p i c m i s e s free and c lea r of all encumbt .mces excep t as here in ment ioned and except as m a y h a v e acc rued 
by or t h r o u g h the a c t s or neg lec t of the Buyer , and to furnish a t his expense , a policy of t i t le i n s u r a n c e in the a m o u n t 
of tho pviuh.T-** pr ice m a t the opt ion of the Seller, an abs t r ac t b r o u g h t to da t e a t t ime of sale or a t any t i m e d u r i n r the 
t e r m "f th is a g r e e m e n t . <»i a t t ime of del ivery of de« d, at the opt ion «>f B u y e r . 
| 20 I t i« he reny e x p r e s s l y unde r s tood and agreed by tho pu rUes he re to t n a t t he B u y e : accep t s t h e said p r o p e r t y 
in )t$ p r e s e n t condi t ion and t h a t t h e r e a r e no r t p t e s e n t a i j a n s , covenan t s , ^r a g r e e m e n t s between the pa.'tiea here.'' * i rh 
r e fe rence to r a id p r o p e r t y excep t as herein specifically set fo r th or a t t a c h e d h e r e t o . 
1
 No Exceptions 
21 The B u y e r and Se l l e r each a g r e e t h a t should they defaul t in any of the covenan ts or a g r e e m e n t s contained h e r e -
in, t h a t the d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y shal l pay all cos ts and expenses , inc luding a reasonab le a t t o r n e y ' s fee, which m a y a r i s e 
or acc rue from enfo rc ing th is a g r e e m e n t , or in ob ta in ing possession of the p remises covered he reby , or in p u r s u i n g a n y 
remedy urovided h e r e u n d e r or by the s t a t u t e s of the S t a t e of U t a h w h e t h e r such remedy is p u r s u e d b y f i l ing a s u i t 
o r otlu rw ise.* 
22 H is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t the s t i pu la t ions aforesa id are to a p p l y to and bind the heirs , execu to r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r ? , ouc-
cesser* , ami a s s i g n s of t he l e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s he re to . 
IN" W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , the said pa r t i e s to th is a g r e e m e n t h a \ e h e r e u n t o s igned the i r n a m e s , t h e d a y and yea r 
f i r s t above v, r i t l e n . 
Signed ( in the p r e s e n c e of 
^Seller p A r l e n e ^ p e t e r s o n 
N I C K J . N I K O L S 
Buyer 
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REMITTANCE AOVICE U T A H T I T L E & A B S T R A C T CO., SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH OETACH BEFORE OEPDS«T(NG 
OATE 
9-15-81 
INVOICE NO. 
T-79110 
D E S C R I P T I O N 
Proceeds of sa le on property 
located a t My ton, Utah 
Buyer: Nikols 
- , - i / • . " ' 
/ 0 ' 
SL/bg 
D R O S S AMOUNT OISCT OR DEDUCT. N E T A M D U 
$ 1 5 , 7 2 0 . 7 
/.' 
/
 t /fj r,t / > 
ADDENDUM II 
RULING - R152 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
MELVIN DALE PETERSON and 
DARLENE PETERSON, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
NICK J NIKOLS, 
DEFENDANT. 
RULING 
Case No. 990000069 
JUDGE: JOHN R ANDERSON 
The Court has before it plaintiffs motion for summary judgement and defendant's 
request for oral argument. The defendant requested oral argument on the motion and the matter 
was argued before the Court on April 6th, 2000. Donna M. Trotter appearing for the plaintiffs 
and John Walsh appearing and arguing the matter for the defendant. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the file and relevant pleadings; the Court has also 
carefully reviewed the memoranda in support of the motion and all affidavits memoranda in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgement. 
The material facts necessary to decide this matter as a matter of law are not in 
dispute. 
The defendant initially made thirty four thousand dollars ($ 34,000.00) of payments 
toward principal and some monthly payments on an outstanding mortgage pursuant to uniform 
real estate contract which the parties entered into on or about September 10th, 1981. 
Contract provided for a total purchase price of sixty five thousand dollars 
($65,000.00) with a down payment of twenty thousand dollars ($ 20,000.00), two ten thousand 
dollar ($ 10,000.00) annual payments and the balance of three thousand one hundred fifty six 
and eighty one (S 3156.81) in monthly payments thereafter to amortize the contract. 
There was damage to and destruction of the real estate or the improvements on the 
real estate and the defendant terminated making payments on the contract September of 1982 
and has made no further payments. 
The defendant vacated the property sometime in 1983, apparently plaintiffs elected 
to proceed under 16(a) of the contract and took possession of the property. 
Based upon existing Utah case law a forfeiture under paragraph 16(a) of uniform 
real estate contract will be allowed, only if the equities are such th'at the amount of money paid 
toward the property as forfeited reasonably approximate the sellers damages or would not be 
unconscionable to allow the seller to both retain the property and the payments made as 
liquidated damages. 
The Court after reviewing the case law in the matter will find as a matter of law that 
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding the issues raised defendant's 
counterclaim regarding novation and accord and satisfaction do not present issues of fact and 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted on those issues for the reasons set forth in 
plaintiffs memorandum. The Court will find as a matter of law that the statute of limitations 
would not run on an action to clear title to real estate and although the forfeiture under 16(a) 
entitles the seller to regain possession of the property there are issues of fact remaining 
regarding damages. This Court will set the matter for trial for determination solely on the issue 
of plaintiff s damages. 
, " ? * ' DATED this / ^ day of APRIL, 2000. 
1 / 
MHN R. ANDERSON 
I DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
AAA 
ADDENDUM III 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
R243 
21 
MLtD 
! »»s7r.'0 r C O L H • 
MOV ! ^  IM" 
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8 08 4 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
MELVIN DALE PETERSON and 
DARLENE PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
NICK J. NIKOLS, and ALL UNKNOWN 
PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM TO 
HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE 
LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED HEREIN WHICH IS THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 990000069 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
The above entitled case came before the Court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 21st day of September, 2000. 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Nick J. Nikols were present, with 
their attorneys, Plaintiffs being represented by Donna M. Trotter 
and Defendant Nick J. Nikols being represented by John Walsh. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, the 
exhibits presented, and the arguments made, makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs, Melvin Dale Peterson and Darlene 
Peterson, (Petersons) have presented competent evidence of their 
title and right to possession of the real property described as: 
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Uintah Special Meridian 
Section 23: Lots 11 and 12 (SW1/4SE1/4) 
(The Property) 
2. Petersons entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(the contract) on September 10, 1981 to sell their interest in the 
property. 
3. The purchaser under the contract was the Defendant Nick 
J. Nikols (Nikols). 
4. According to the terms of the contract, Nikols agreed, 
among other covenants, to keep the property insured and pay 
the general property taxes and other assessments. 
5. Nikols paid $20,000.00 down on the day of closing, 
$10,000.00 within 30 days, and made payments to Commercial Security 
(the bank holding first mortgage position) in the amount of 
2 
$5,856.00. Nikols also paid an additional $3,000.00 at or near the 
time he ceased making payments. For a total paid by Nikols of 
$38,856.00. 
6. Nikols did not pay all the sums due under the 
contract. 
7. Nikols did let the insurance policy on the property 
lapse. 
8. Nikols failed to pay the real property taxes and the 
Indian Water assessments. 
9. Petersons elected to terminate the Real Estate 
Contract under paragraph 16(A) and took possession of the premises 
about June 1, 1983. 
10. There was no valid evidence at trial to support any 
numerical claims for vandalism or damages. 
11. Petersons paid $442.65 for taxes and $84.21 for the 
Indian water fees during the time Nikols was in occupancy of the 
property. 
12. Petersons had rented the property in the past for $250 
per month. 
13. Nikols agreed to pay $65,000 for this property. 
3 
14. The property in its present state could be sold for 
$30,000. 
15. The loss of the benefit of the bargain to Petersons is 
$35,000, plus the total of the taxes and water assessments. 
16. All unknown persons who have or claim to have any 
right, title, estate lien or interest in the property described 
herein, were served by publication which was completed August 15, 
2000. 
17. The time for answering Plaintiff's complaint has 
expired as to the unknown defendants. 
18. The Defendants identified as "all unknown persons 
who have or claim to have any right, title, estate lien or interest 
in the property described herein" failed to plead or otherwise 
defend in this action. 
19. The default of all unknown persons who have or claim 
to have any right, title, estate lien or interest in the property 
has been entered. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes: 
1. Nikols owes no further amounts to Petersons under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
4 
2. Nikols, forfeited his interest in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract by failing to abide by its terms. 
3. The amount of the payments made by Nikols, which were 
retained by Petersons, was not exorbitant or inequitable in view of 
Petersons' actual damages. 
4. Nick J. Nikols is entitled to a judgment against 
Melvin Dale Peterson and Darlene Peterson in the amount of 
$3,385.00. 
5. Ownership of the property described herein is hereby 
quieted to che Plaintiffs, Melvin Dale Peterson and Darlene 
Peterson: 
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Uintah Special Meridian 
Section 23: Lots 11 and 12 (SW1/4SE1/4) 
6. Each party must pay their own attorneys fees and 
costs. 
DATE D this ^ 0 < day of ^ 
ohn fefT Anderson, D i s t r i c t Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Nick J. Nikols 
5 
ADDENDUM IV 
AMENDED ORDER PER RULING DATED 
25TH DAY OF JANUARY 2001 
R298 
22 
y*cbi\ 9-Tt c\ 
FILfcD 
DL;THiOrCOUR 
FEB n 23H 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 22 00 
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
-F-
MELVIN DALE PETERSON and 
DARLENE PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
NICK J. NIKOLS, and ALL UNKNOWN 
PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM TO 
HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE 
LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED HEREIN WHICH IS THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER 
PER RULING 
DATED 2 51H DAY 
OF JANUARY, 2001 
Civil No. 990000069 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came on regularly for trial 
September 21, 2000, in the above entitled Court before the 
Honorable John R. Anderson sitting without jury. The parties 
appearing in person, by and through counsel. Evidence was adduced, 
argument was made, and the Court makes and enters the following 
ruling. 
The Court has heretofore entered a ruling considering motions 
for summary judgment on the elements of law the Court felt were 
applicable to the case. Reference is made to that ruling dated 
April 7, 2000. Plaintiffs elected to terminate the contract under 
paragraph 16(a) and took possession of the property about June 1, 
1983. On the basis of that ruling, the only issue reserved for 
trial was the determination as to whether or not the money paid 
into the contract should be allowed as a forfeiture (whether it 
reasonably approximated the seller's actual damages) or whether to 
allow the plaintiffs to retain the amounts paid would be 
unconscionable and unreasonable. 
From the evidence adduced at trial, it appears as though 
pursuant to the uniform real estate contract entered into by the 
parties September 10, 1981, the purchaser Nick Nikols agreed to pay 
$65,000 for the property. He also agreed among other covenants to 
keep the property insured and pay the general property taxes and 
other assessments. 
Nikols paid $20,000 down on the date of closing, $10,000 
within 3 0 days, and payments to the bank in the first mortgage 
position of $488 per month together with some late charges and 
other payments, totaling by a preponderance of the evidence $5,856. 
There was also evidence adduced that Nikols paid an additional 
$4,000 at or near the time he ceased making payments to the bank. 
The Court, from the record, finds that Nikols paid a total of 
$39,856. 
2 
The Court must analyze the seller's actual and apparent 
damages to determine whether under the case law to allow the seller 
to retain the moneys paid by the buyer would be fair and equitable, 
or whether the amount proposed to be forfeited is inequitable as 
being exorbitant. 
The Court must analyze the seller's actual damages. 
The seller has claimed destruction of the property and loss of 
rental value because the purchaser failed to keep the property 
insured. 
The Court finds that the defendant did in fact let the policy 
lapse, but heard no evidence as to whether vandalism would be 
covered under any policy, or what the actual costs of the vandalism 
would be. There was no valid evidence at trial to support any 
numerical claims for vandalism or damages. 
The buyers indicated they really attached no value to the 
building itself. It was an old structure and their interest was in 
the unique value of the land. 
The seller testified that the property had been rented in the 
past for a rental value of $250 per month. 
Based upon the state of the record, the Court cannot, as a 
matter of fact finding, determine that there was an actual dollar 
monetary property vandalism loss. 
The defendant's testified there was a broken out window, and 
3 
perhaps the door frame had been broken and was hanging, but could 
be repaired for $350. 
The seller has claimed loss of rents due to the alleged 
vandalism, but the Court will not allow loss of rents as the seller 
had a duty to mitigate his damage and could have initiated repairs 
sufficient to get the property re-rented. 
The seller has claimed reimbursement for property tax assessed 
and Indian water fees assessed during the period of occupancy. 
The Court finds these actual out of pocket damages to be 
$422.65 for fourteen months prorated taxes and $84.21 for Indian 
water assessments. 
The most difficult part of the Court's ruling will be based on 
the analysis of the seller's loss of bargain. Recognizing the 
principal that parties should be permitted to enter into contracts 
that may actually be one-sided or unreasonable should be rejected 
by the Court. It is generally held that persons have a right to 
contract freely to make real and genuine mistakes when their 
dealings are at arms length. See for example Carlson v Hamilton, 
8 Utah 2d.272,332 P.2d989(1958). 
There is a line of Utah cases dealing with forfeitures under 
paragraph 16(a) of the Utah Version of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, and whether such forfeitures are inequitable or 
exorbitant. This Court, in reviewing the cases, cannot assign a 
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percentage value to the amount of the forfeiture, but only can 
enter into a specific analysis of each case according to its facts. 
The language in Cole v Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 2d 
623(1956) is instructive: 
" absent fraud, the seller is entitled to be 
credited, in the computation of damage sustained because 
of the breach of contract, the difference between the 
contract price and the price for which he can sell the 
forfeited property." 
One of the items set forth in Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 
243 P.2d 446(1952) is the analysis of the loss of an advantageous 
bargain. 
The appraiser who prepared the report which was rejected as 
evidence by the Court was not present for cross-examination. The 
only evidence the Court has as to the value of this unique piece of 
property was the price which Nikols was willing to pay, to wit, 
$65,000. 
While having no direct bearing on the actual value of the 
land, the Duchesne County Assessor had listed the property as 
having a value of about $25,000 in 1982. 
Further from the evidence adduced at trial, Commercial 
Security Bank was willing to lend $25,000 as against the value of 
the real estate without insisting on having the improvements or the 
buildings insured. 
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Applying the formula from the evidence before the Court, the 
Court finds the property in its present state could be sold for 
$30,000. On that basis, the loss of his bargain, or the loss of 
the benefit o£ his bargain under the contract is $35,000, plus the 
total of the taxes and the water assessments. The seller has had 
the use and benefit of $39,886 from the dates paid, however, seller 
has had to wait to get marketable title. It is the Court's opinion 
that the amount retained is not inequitable or exorbitant in view 
of the Petersons' actual damages, i.e., $35,507. The Court is of 
the opinion tfrat $3,385 should be refunded by Petersons, and no 
additional amounts paid by Nikols. For reasons heretofore stated 
on the record, attorney's fees will not be awarded. No costs are 
awarded. The plaintiff is to prepare findings and judgment. 
DATED this ^V^dfay of /fJ^0 .2001. 
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ADDENDUM V 
CORRECTED JUDGMENT 
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DONNA M. TROTTER - 808 4 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
855 East 200 North (112-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (435)722-3928 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
MELVIN DALE PETERSON and 
DARLENE PETERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NICK J. NIKOLS, and ALL UNKNOWN ) CORRECTED 
PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM TO ) JUDGMENT 
HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE ) 
LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY ) 
DESCRIBED HEREIN WHICH IS THE ) 
SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, ) Civil No. 990000069 
) Judge: John R. Anderson 
Defendants. ) 
This matter having come before the Court on a conference 
telephone call initiated by Defendants counsel. John Walsh 
attorney for Defendants and Gayle McKeachnie attorney for 
Plaintiffs participated. 
The Court clarified its previous rulings and Judgment, and 
that clarification is incorporated herein. 
vC<\WNc wcve l , CLERK 
BY -UX-X- DEPUTY 
& TROTTER, P . C . 
The Court having made its Findings of Fact and entered its 
Conclusions of Law, and based thereon, the Court hereby, 
ORDERS, ADJUGES, AND DECREES that: 
1. The defendants, Nick J. Nikols is awarded Judgment in 
the amount of $4,385.00. 
2. Defendant, NICK J. NIKOLS, is hereby declared to have 
no interest in the above described real property and title is 
hereby quieted in the Plaintiffs, Melvin Dale Peterson and 
Darlene Peterson as against any claims of the named Defendant, 
Nick J. Nikols in the following described lands in Duchesne 
County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Uintah Special Meridian 
Section 23: Lots 11 and 12 (SE 1/4 SE 1/4) 
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